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Too Little, Too Late? Brexit Day, Transitional Periods and the Implications of MIB v 





For several decades the UK has been in breach of key aspects of the Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Directives (MVID). This has been observed through academic commentary and 
confirmed in successful state liability claims. There has also been a manifestly inconsistent 
approach taken by national courts at first instance and at appeal in the correct application of 
EU jurisprudence. In 2018 the High Court reversed years of inconsistent jurisprudence and 
changed key aspects of national protection for the third party victims of negligent uninsured 
drivers. In short, the 2018 High Court decision in Lewis v Tindale, as confirmed in MIB v 
Lewis [2019] at the Court of Appeal, extended the geographic scope of compulsory motor 
insurance, held the national compensatory body as an emanation of the state, and confirmed 
directly effective elements of the MVID. In relation to motor vehicle insurance, the 
importance of these decisions cannot be overstated. They represent a genuine sea-change in 
approach and acceptance nationally of established EU jurisprudence. Yet the victory is likely 
to be short-lived given the UK’s imminent withdrawal from the EU and the intransigence of 
the government and the MIB to give effect to the rulings.  
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It is trite comment to say that the UK and the EU have had an often fractious relationship, 
especially when it comes to the UK’s correct, full and timely implementation of EU law. 
Numerous examples exist of legal challenges against the UK because of differences in the 
laws which have disadvantaged individuals.
1
 This conflict of laws has been played out in the 
insurance arena when considering the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID) and the 
UK’s transposition and implementation. Victories have been achieved through the use of 
state liability actions, yet disparities remain in national legislative and administrative 
provisions. Most notably, and as addressed in the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in MIB v 
Lewis [2019] EWCA Civ 909, are the geographic scope to which the compulsory insurance 
of motor vehicles apply and the status of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) as an emanation 
of the state. Changes in these areas began in the High Court in September 2018. It was in 
Lewis v Tindale, Motor Insurers’ Bureau and Secretary of State for Transport [2018] EWHC 
2376 (QB) where the court heard a claim for damages relating to an incident involving a 
motor vehicle. In this case, the claimant, Mr Lewis, suffered grievous injuries due to the 
driving, on private land, of Mr Tindale. As Mr Tindale was uninsured, Mr Lewis had to seek 
damages from the national compensatory body, the MIB. The court at first instance had to 
determine if the MIB was required to meet a judgment in favour of the claimant under the 
Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88). The Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 (the relevant 
administrative agreement at the time) requires the MIB to satisfy any judgment against the 
driver where the judgment has not been settled within seven days. This is effective to 
                                                 
1
 See as recently as February 2019 with the Supreme Court judgment in Cameron v Liverpool Victoria 
Insurance Co Ltd [2019] UKSC 6 involving an untraced driver. The judgment is wrong on a number of points, 
not least the application of EU law to national implementing measures. For commentary see N. Bevan 
“Principle v Process” (2019) 15 March New Law Journal 14. 
 
 
judgments in respect of a liability to which compulsory insurance is applicable in the RTA88. 
The relevant section of the RTA88 is s. 145 which covers the death or injury to persons or 
property caused or arising out of the use of a vehicle on a road or other public place. Soole J 
concluded that the MIB was not required to satisfy the judgment under s. 145 as the accident 
here occurred on private land. Rather, it was obliged to compensate Mr Lewis due to the 
application of the MVID which was not so restricted in its geographic scope. The MIB was 
an emanation of the state, articles of the MVID had direct effect, and therefore the vertical 
application of those directives imposed the obligation on the MIB. 
 
The High Court granted Mr Lewis the right to recover compensation from the MIB. In June 
2019, in MIB v Lewis,
2
 the Court of Appeal concurred, extending the ruling in respect of the 
direct effect of arts 3
3
 and 10 of the MVID. These judgments have significant implications 
for the third-party victims of motor vehicle accidents and their protection. The judgment will 
only last until Brexit day (scheduled at the time of writing for 31 October 2019) or 
throughout any transitional period agreed between the UK and the EU if the UK has not 
already withdrawn its membership. Even the application of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018, which at s. 7 provides for the retaining of EU laws in domestic law, 
and s. 6(3), which maintains the validity, meaning and effect of such laws in accordance with 
the general principles of EU law may not protect the rights of third-party victims. This, we 
argue, is for several reasons. First, due to the general hesitancy of national courts to apply a 
purposive interpretation of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Further, there has been a lack of acceptance of the ruling in MIB v Lewis by the 
MIB. Finally, the lack of legislative action in light of this national ruling does not instil 
confidence that the implications of the judgment will be fully and consistently applied 
following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. However, and on a positive note, the cases 
establish landmark judgments which have implications for drivers, insurers, third party 
victims and extend to the criminal law. Contrary to the MIB’s assertion that the CJEU 
decision in Vnuk
4
 was wrong and that this was implicitly accepted through the EU 
Commission’s subsequent consultation prior to the enactment of a seventh MVID, 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance extends to private land. It is not restricted to “a road or 
other public place” and this restrictive definition in the RTA88 s. 145 must now be 
considered bad law. Secondly, the MIB is an emanation of the state and this reverses previous 
national authority as to its status. This arms third party victims with a cause of action against 
the MIB directly. Thus, rather than having to pursue a public law remedy through state 
liability against the UK to recover compensation, the vertical direct effect of any directly 
effective and incorrectly transposed provisions of the MVIDs are available. This not only 
provides affected individuals with access to their rights rather than merely with the 
opportunity to recover damages lost through inaction on behalf of the state, but it also 
proactively changes national law through purposive statutory interpretation. Finally, as both 
arts 3 and 10 of the sixth MVID
5
 have direct effect, they are consequently enforceable against 
emanations of the state.  
 
The Facts 
                                                 
2
 MIB v Lewis [2019] EWCA Civ 909. 
3
 Article 3 prescribes minimum standards of civil liability insurance necessary to provide comparable levels of 
compensation for third party victims of motor vehicle accident through the EU. 
4
 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav (C-162/13) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146; [2016] R.T.R. 10. 
5
 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to 




In June 2013, an accident occurred on private land leaving Mr Lewis with life changing 
injuries. It transpires that Mr Tindale thought that Mr Lewis and his associate were 
attempting to steal items from his premises. Mr Tindale entered his four-wheel drive Nissan 
vehicle and pursued Mr Lewis first along a road and footpath, and then, through a barbed 
wire fence, onto a field where his vehicle struck Mr Lewis. Mr Lewis suffered severe injuries 
to his spine and brain. For the purposes of national law, the vehicle being driven by Mr 
Tindale at the time of the accident was uninsured and the injuries were sustained on private 
land, not a road or other public place. Further, Mr Tindale lacked the means to satisfy any 
judgment. He was debarred from defending the claim, and the second defendant, the MIB, 
argued that it too was not responsible for compensating Mr Lewis, relying on  RTA88 s. 
145.
6
 The MIB’s obligation to satisfy a judgment, it claimed, only applies in respect of a 
“relevant liability” and due to the limitation of compulsory insurance only applying to motor 
vehicles on a “road or other public place,” the accident here was beyond its remit. 
 
The Relevant Law: the Road Traffic Act, the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement and the 
Motor Vehicles Insurance Directive 
 
The RTA88 is the principal legislative provision for the regulation of the use of motor 
vehicles. At s. 143 it provides  
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act – (a) a person must not use a 
motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] unless there is in force in relation 
to the use of the vehicle by that person such a policy of insurance or such a 
security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this 
Part of this Act… 
 
Further, RTA88 s. 145 requires, for compliance with the Act 
 
(1) … a policy of insurance [satisfying] the following conditions. (2) The policy must 
be issued by an authorised insurer. (3) … the policy – must insure such person, 
persons or classes of persons as may be specified in the policy in respect of any 
liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily 
injury to any person or damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the use of 
the vehicle on a road or other public place in Great Britain... 
 
And, at RTA88 s. 95, an authorised insurer is an insurer which is a member of the MIB. 
Therefore collectively, these sections require that all motor vehicles used on a road or other 
public place must be subject to an insurance policy issued by an insurer which is a member of 
the MIB. 
 
At the EU level, the first MVID, when enacted in 1972, required Member States to, 
 
take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of 




                                                 
6
 Which places requirements as to a valid policy of insurance. 
7
 Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure 
against such liability [1972] OJ L103/1, Art.3(1). 
 
 
That original MVID and its further amendments have subsequently been consolidated into a 
sixth Directive which provides in Chapter 4 at art. 10, for Member States to make,  
 
provision for a body to guarantee that the victim [of an accident involving a motor 
vehicle] will not remain without compensation where the vehicle which caused the 




 MVID, member states were to establish a guarantee fund to act as the insurer 
of last resort to compensate the victims of negligent uninsured motorists, untraceable 
motorists and for losses resultant from the negligent driving of “foreign” motorists. In the 
UK, this position is occupied by the MIB through two extra-statutory arrangements, the UDA 
2015 (and Supplementary Agreement concluded in 2017) and the Untraced Drivers 
Agreement 2017 (UtDA). In Evans v Secretary of State and Motor Insurers Bureau
9
 the 
CJEU held that it was within a member state’s authority to delegate this responsibility and 
power to a pre-existing body (such as the MIB which has held the domestic role of 
compensating the victims of uninsured drivers since its initial agreement with the Minister 
(now Secretary of State) since 1946). 
 
The Role of the MIB 
 
The MIB is a body empowered under a requirement of the MVID to ensure, subject to 
exclusions, that funds are available to compensate the innocent victims of a motor vehicle 
accident due to an unsatisfied judgment.
10
 The MIB and the Secretary of State for Transport 
together have established, over a number of years and through a series of arrangements, two 
Agreements which supplement the RTA88 and give effect to aspects of the MVID – the UDA 
2015 and the UtDA 2017. These Agreements have been modified on many occasions to give 
effect to the developing MVIDs and to remedy defects and incompatibilities with the national 
law and administrative arrangements with the EU Directives. This includes unreasonable and 
unlawful restrictions in the scope of the UDA and UtDA when compared with the UK’s 
obligations under EU law.
11
 The current UDA 2015 was last amended in 2017, albeit Lewis
12
 
relates to the 1999 Agreement.  
 
The Implications of the Judgment 1: The MIB as an Emanation of the State  
 
The issue at stake, and the significance of this case, is the acceptance by the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal of the MIB as fulfilling the requirements of an emanation of the State. 
This is important for liability under EU law and, as a private company and one which 
establishes agreements rather than contracts with the state, the UK has consistently held (as 
identified in Byrne v MIB
13
) in contradiction to other member states including Ireland and the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU, that the MIB cannot be an emanation of the state. Byrne was 
interesting however in that it did at least, through the reasoning of Flaux J (who provided the 
                                                 
8
 Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17.  
9
 Evans v Secretary of State and Motor Insurers Bureau (C-63/01) ECLI:EU:C:2003:650. 
10
 UDA 1999 cl 5 (now UDA 2015 cl 3). 
11
 For commentary see J. Marson, and K. Ferris “The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 as a Legitimate 
Source of Authority” (2017) 38(2) Statute Law Review 133. 
12
 Lewis v Tindale, Motor Insurers’ Bureau and Secretary of State for Transport [2018] EWHC 2376 (QB). 
13
 Byrne v MIB [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB). 
 
 
sole judgment in MIB v Lewis at the Court of Appeal), accept Wagner Miret
14
 and the 
position that where the member state had designated the MIB as the body to implement the 
requirements for a compensatory body under the MVID, provisions of the MVID could have 
direct effect against it. 
 
It has been argued previously that the UK’s position on the status of the MIB as (not being) 
an emanation of the state is incorrect and illogical.
15
 Following the UK’s accession to the 
European Economic Community (as was) in 1973 the UK surrendered its sovereignty in 
given areas and was subject to the new legal order that had been established since the 
1960s.
16
 The MIB is a private company limited by guarantee and operates to reduce the 





 drivers in the UK (and of foreign drivers through the “green card scheme”).
19
 It 
does so by acting as an insurer of last resort whereby victims, who would otherwise be left 
without a remedy, have access to a compensatory fund from which to claim. The MIB exists 
due to a proportion of each motor insurance premium supplementing this fund. Further, every 
insurer which operates a business underwriting compulsory motor insurance is required to be 




Due to the agreements established between the MIB and the Secretary of State, national case 
law has held that in regards to it acting as a compensatory body to fulfil requirements under 
EU law, it is not an emanation of the state. This is due to the nature of the agreement between 
the parties whereby on the application of 12 months’ notice,
21
 the agreement and 
responsibilities of the MIB can be terminated. In such an event, the MIB would have no 
further liability for accidents or responsibility for the actions of the untraced and uninsured 





A distinction existed, prior to Lewis, regarding the responsibility for compensating third party 
victims who had suffered injury and loss due to the actions of an uninsured motorist or 
unidentified vehicle. This was, at first instance, the MIB as insurer of last resort. Where the 
issue was the misapplication of the UDA, the victim’s claim rested with the state. Flaux J, in 
Byrne considered that the MIB did not satisfy the test of an emanation of the state as provided 




                                                 
14
 Teodoro Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (C-334/92) ECLI:EU:C:1993:945, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 
49. 
15
 J. Marson, K. Ferris, and A. Nicholson “Irreconcilable Differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives” (2017) 1 Journal of Business Law 51. 
16
 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen (C-26/62) ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
17
 In the event of accident being caused, or contributed to by, a driver who was uninsured at the time (holding no 
valid policy of insurance), but who, by the nature of the event is identified, the MIB will consider dealing with 
the claim for compensation from the victim. 
18
 This applies to victims of an accident where the driver deemed responsible for the accident leaves the scene 
without identifying themselves and cannot be traced. The MIB will consider claims of compensation in respect 
of damages to property and personal injury. 
19
 The green card scheme applies to accidents caused through the negligent driving of foreign motorists. Here 
the MIB may deal with the victim’s claim for damages to property or personal injury rather than require them to 
seek communication from the foreign insurer. 
20
 See RTA88 ss.95, 143 and 145(2). 
21
 The UDA 1999, cl.4(2). 
22
 The UDA 1999, cl.4(1). 
23
 Foster v British Gas (C-188/89) ECLI:EU:C:1990:313. 
 
 
a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a 
measure adopted by the state, for providing a public service under the control of the 
state and has for that purpose special powers beyond that which result from the 




He did acknowledge that providing compensation to the victim of an uninsured driver was a 
public service, but, and through a very restrictive interpretation of the Foster tests, reasoned 
that the state did not provide any control over the way in which the MIB carried out its 
functions. Further, the MIB had no special powers conferred on it either through the RTA88 
or the Agreements made between it and the Secretary of State. Similarly in Mighell and ors v 
Reading
25
 the claimants, seeking to apply the doctrine of direct effect
26
 of the Second MVID, 
failed to persuade the Court of Appeal that the MIB was an emanation of the State. Byrne and 
Mighell were joined, at least by the Advocate-General in Evans v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions
27
 in the view that the MIB was not an emanation of 
the state. However the CJEU disagreed with the position of the UK and the Advocate-
General. When considering the application of the MVID, the Directive did not refer to the 
legal status of the compensatory body and the “fact that the source of the obligation of the 
body in question lies in an agreement concluded between it and a public authority is 
immaterial…”
28
 In MIB v Lewis Flaux LJ seemingly had a change of heart and agreed that, 
like the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland (MIBI) in Farrell v Whitty (No 2)
29
 the MIB,  
 
possesses special powers by virtue of the provisions of the RTA which oblige all 
authorised motor insurers to be members of the MIB and to contribute to its 
funding… Accordingly, like the MIBI, the MIB is an emanation of the State against 





To further the broad interpretation of the definition of an emanation of the state, in Rieser 





 limited liability companies owned, in the first instance, by the 
Austrian State and by a local authority association (in the second case) were held as 
emanations of the state. More recently in this line of judicial reasoning, and most explicitly, 
the MIB of Hungary was held an emanation of the state in Csonka.
33
 Here the CJEU was 




                                                 
24
 at [20]. 
25
 Mighell and ors v Reading [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1251. 
26
 Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt (C-8/81) ECLI:EU:C:1982:7 at [25]: “… wherever the provisions of 
a Directive appear, as far as their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, 
those provisions may, in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied 
upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the Directive or insofar as the provisions 
define rights which individuals are able to assert against the State.” 
27
 Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (C-63/01) ECLI:EU:C:2002:615; 
[2005] All E.R. (EC) 763. 
28
 at [34]. 
29
 Farrell v Whitty (C-413/15) ECLI:EU:C:2017:745. 
30
 at [74-75]. 
31
 Rieser Internationale Transporte GmbH v Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (Asfinag) (C-
157/02) ECLI:EU:C:2004:76. 
32
 Sozialhilfeverband Rohrbach (C297/03) ECLI:EU:C:2005:315. 
33
 Csonka v Magyar Allam (C-409/11) ECLI:EU:C:2013:512; [2014] 1 C.M.L.R. 14. 
34
 at [31]. 
 
 
Previously it was argued: 
 
If one also considers the public service function of the MIB, its requirement to follow 
the provisions of the MVID, to compensate victims of uninsured and untraced drivers, 
its duty to compensate for motor vehicle accidents abroad, and its relationship with 
the Department for Transport, it satisfies many of the necessary public service 
provisions… evidence of its control by the State can be seen in the agreements 
reached between the two, and the requirement for it to comply with the MVID. 
Finally, the MIB’s ability to almost single-handedly legislate on behalf of the State… 
its powers to settle claims, its powers to compel disclosure and to deny access to 
compensation for infractions of procedural requirements, appear collectively to be 
strong indicators that it does possess the necessary special powers (under Foster), 




The most recent judgment on the issue, if another were needed, was as to the status of the 
MIBI in Farrell (No. 2). Here the Supreme Court of Ireland was faced with determining the 
compatibility of EU law with national law in respect of compensation for injuries involving a 
motor vehicle and exclusion of liability. Four passengers were occupying the rear of a van, 
but one which did not have seats. They were injured following a collision and one of the 
occupants, Ann Marie Farrell, died as a result of the accident. The insurer denied 
responsibility for compensation due to the existence of an exclusion clause which allowed the 
insurer to escape liability where a vehicle involved in an accident was not designed and 
constructed with seating. Her sister pursued compensation through the MIBI
36
 but this was 
refused on the basis of the application of that exclusion clause which effectively removed its 
responsibility too. When viewed in accordance with the MVID, this exclusion of liability 
breaches the very restrictive exclusions of liability permissible at EU law.
37
 As such, the 
Supreme Court of Ireland referred to the CJEU a question seeking to determine the status of 
the MIBI. In essence, the response of the CJEU would determine whether victims of 
uninsured drivers could claim directly against the MIBI or had to continue to pursue state 
liability claims for alleged breaches of EU law against Ireland. The CJEU held Ireland in 
breach by permitting the exclusion of liability in this regard and Elaine Farrell received an 
undisclosed settlement and stopped her claim for further damages. The legal matter then 
became a dispute between the MIBI and the Irish state as to who was to settle the payment. 
Was the MIBI an emanation of the state or did the status quo, at least in relation to national 
jurisprudence, of a state liability claim being the only remedy available continue? At the High 
Court in Ireland, Birmingham J referred to commentary by Advocate-General Stix-Hackl in 
Farrell (No. 1)
38
 where agreement was made that the MIBI should be accepted as occupying 
the same role as the Irish state for the purposes of the direct enforcement of the provisions of 
the MVID. The CJEU had moved away from the restrictive and narrow interpretation of an 
emanation of the state as provided in Foster to one where the body in question was to be 
viewed as having been responsible for providing a public service.
39
 The jurisprudence of 
                                                 
35
 J. Marson, K. Ferris, and A. Nicholson “Irreconcilable Differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives” (2017) 1 Journal of Business Law 51, 58. 
36
 Under the Road Traffic Act 1961 s. 78 of Ireland, all motor insurers had to be members of the MIBI (the same 
obligation as is required in the UK). 
37
 Under art. 2(1) of the Second MVID (now art. 13 of the Sixth Directive) the only exclusion to an insurer’s 
indemnity requirements is where the passenger voluntarily entered the vehicle causing the loss or damage in the 
knowledge that it was stolen and the insurer can prove this knowledge. 
38
 Farrell v Whitty (C-356/05) ECLI:EU:C:2007:229; [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 46. 
39
 This is a somewhat moot point however, as Birmingham J considered that even were the three-stage test in 
Foster to have been applied here, the conclusion as to the status of the MIBI would have been the same. 
 
 
cases in the UK, applying as they did a checklist of features of the body in question, was 
unnecessary and an emanation of the state could exist without it being under direct state 
control. The MIBI was held as a body which fulfilled the functions of those authorised under 
the MVID, the Irish state had control of the requirements of insurance which the MIBI had to 
cover in the event of an absence of insurance, and the statutory requirement for membership 
of the MIBI for those organisations offering services in the Irish motor vehicle insurance 
market elevated the status of the MIBI above a mere private organisation entering an 
agreement with the state. 
 
Crucially when exploring the ability for a body to occupy the role of an emanation of the 
state, and in the case of the MIBI to undertake this public service, the Supreme Court of 
Ireland referred to the judgment given by the CJEU. When reviewing the Foster decision, it 
noted that the CJEU referred to bodies which were subject to the authority or control of the 
state or had special powers.
40
 The use of the word “or” rather than “and” meant the Foster 
tripartite test was illustrative rather than exhaustive and further, that the direct effect of 
Directives was possible against such a body which did not satisfy the three Foster tests. 
Consequently, Farrell (No. 2) has broadened the concept of the “state” even further than the 
existing line of authoritative bodies
41
 and permitted the direct effect of Directives against 
MIBs in the member states. 
 
Given this concerted movement in other member states and through the reasoning provided 
by the CJEU, the High Court in Lewis held the MIB to be an emanation of the state. This was 
despite an important distinction between the MIB and the MIBI. The MIBI agreement with 
the state empowered the Minister of State, in certain circumstances, to determine an issue in 
dispute between the claimant and the MIBI. This power is not replicated in the UK with the 
MIB’s Agreements with the Secretary of State, although given MIB v Lewis and the 
relaxation of the Foster tests, this facet may be a less significant feature now. Of course, had 
the Court of Appeal not held that the MIB was an emanation of the state, there would have 
been negative consequences for the UK. At the most basic level, the UK would have been in 
breach of its obligations under the MVID since the commencement of the obligation to 
establish a compensatory body.  
 
The import of this ruling in holding the MIB as an emanation of the state should not be 
underestimated. It furnishes individuals who find the UK in breach of its EU obligations with 
the following options. They may continue to bring separate public law proceedings for 
damages under state liability (as per Delaney).
42
 Further, and post-Lewis, where a third party 
victim finds inconsistencies between the MVID and the UDA (extending by implication to 
                                                 
40
 at [18]. 
41
 Not an exhaustive list but it includes former nationalised utility bodies (Foster v British Gas (C-188/89) 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:313 and Griffin and others v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] I.R.L.R. 15); the board of 
governors of a State school (National Union of Teachers and others v Governing Body of St Mary's Church of 
England (Aided) Junior School and others [1997] I.R.L.R. 242 CA); a regional authority (Fratelli Costanzo SpA 
v Comune di Milano (C-103/88) ECLI:EU:C:1989:256); a police force (Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC 
(C-222/84) ECLI:EU:C:1986:206); a health authority (Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire 
Area Health Authority (Teaching) (C-152/84) ECLI:EU:C:1986:84); and a tax authority (Case 8/81 Becker v 
Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt (C-8/81) ECLI:EU:C:1982:7). Further, this has extended to bodies legally 
distinct from the State, but to which administrative tasks have been delegated or assigned (Case C-424/97 
Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein (C-424/97) ECLI:EU:C:2000:357). 
42





 that individual may seek to use the directly effective articles in the MVID
44
 
against the MIB directly. It also imposes on the MIB, a private organisation which has 
entered into an agreement with the Secretary of State, joint and several liability to 
compensate third party victims of accidents due to the failure of the UK to correctly transpose 
the MVID. This extends a potential liability on the MIB to satisfy judgments far beyond its 
current prescribed arrangement and calls into question the legitimacy of the exclusions of 
liability in the UDA and UtDA. 
 
The Implications of the Judgment 2: The End of the Geographical Scope of Compulsory 
Insurance 
 
The RTA88 s. 145(3)(a) originally required the compulsory insurance of motor vehicles used 
on a “road.” In Clarke v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation plc
45
 a motor 
accident occurred in the car park of a supermarket and it was at the House of Lords where the 
geographic extent of the requirement for compulsory motor vehicle insurance was 
considered. The Third MVID
46
 at Art. 5 referred to parties involved in a “road traffic 
accident” but also made no similar limitation to the requirement of compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance applying only to those on a road. Despite accepting the disparity between EU and 
national law, the Lords refused to interpret the RTA88 as extending beyond the word “road.” 
Soon after the decision, the UK enacted the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) 
Regulations 2000 which amended s. 145 by including the additions “… or other public place” 
to comply with the MVID.  
 
In 2014, a case which still resonates throughout the member states due to the changes it made 
to the geographic scope of compulsory motor vehicle insurance was decided. It was in Vnuk, 
where the CJEU, in a reference from Slovenia, held that, for the purposes of art. 3(1) of the 
MVID,
47
 and to ensure consistency in interpretation and application of the law throughout the 
EU, compulsory insurance applied to vehicles used on private land. Thus the “use” of a 
vehicle could not be left to member states to decide. The interpretation of vehicle through art. 
3(1) extended to “… any use of a vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that 
vehicle.”
48
 Given that RTA88 s. 185 defines a motor vehicle as “a mechanically propelled 
vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads,” art. 3(1) and s. 185 appear misaligned. The 
national law fails completely, including the national exclusions from insurance of a range of 
vehicles, to fulfil the requirements of art. 3 of the MVID. For instance, presently, and as 
noted in the supplementary guidance notes included in the Agreements (UDA and UtDA), 
bodies including local authorities, the National Health Service, and the police are exempt 
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from the requirement for compulsory insurance cover. Lewis, along with recent 
pronouncements from the CJEU, make this position untenable. 
 
Vnuk was accompanied by Andrade v Salvador & ors
49
 and Torreiro v AIG Europe Ltd
50
 
where the CJEU held the use of vehicles was not restricted to road use, 
 
that is to say, to travel on public roads, but that that concept covers any use of a 
vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle. 
 
Soole J in Lewis rejected the invitation to remove or add words to RTA88 s. 145(3)(a) to 
comply with this jurisprudence as to do so “clearly goes against the grain and thrust of 
legislation which provides that limitation”
51
 which would amount to an amendment and not 
an interpretation. It further ran the risk of having the effect of imposing retrospective criminal 
liability for the use of uninsured vehicles on private land. He was not convinced that a 




The result is an interpretation of RTA88 s. 185 which currently reads as too narrow and will 
have to be broadened in scope to include those motor vehicles currently exempted. The 
concept of “vehicle” will be subject to new interpretation and may include those which were 
never designed for use on the public road but which will now have to be insured against third 
party claims. 
 
The Implications of the Judgment 3: The Court of Appeal and the Direct Effect of the MVID 
 
Flaux LJ began the examination of the parties’ submissions from para 38 of his judgment. 
The first issue contested was as to the direct effect of art. 3 of the sixth MVID. The MIB 
argued that as the Article expressly requires measures to be taken by the state, it is by its 
nature conditional. It was conceded by the MIB that the jurisprudence of the CJEU in Vnuk 
and the subsequent cases (although whilst Juliana
53
 was given passing reference (paras. 51, 
52, 62 and 71), Andrade only features in cursory form with a Juliana quotation in the 
judgment at para 71)
54
 established that the obligation under that Article covered the use of 
vehicles on private land as well as a road or in a public place and was thus sufficiently 
precise.
55
 Regarding the unconditional nature of the obligation, given the Article’s 
requirement for the state to take [all appropriate] measures to ensure civil liability in respect 
of the use of vehicles is covered by insurance, the MIB identified that one of the requirements 
for the imposition of direct effect of the Directive was missing. Three scenarios were 
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proposed to demonstrate the issue: (i) where no appropriate measures have been taken by the 
state; (ii) where partially appropriate measures have been taken and (iii) where the state’s 




Example (i) demonstrates the lack of direct effect of the Directive, as established in 
Francovich v Italian Republic,
57
 because of the non-transposition of the Directive. Further, 
the provisions of the Directive were not sufficiently precise and unconditional given the 
complete discretion afforded Member States.
58
 Example (ii) would also fail as in Wagner 
Miret due to the incomplete transposition of the same Directive as in Francovich. The 
argument presented was by analogy to art. 10 MVID relating to the RTA88 and there being 
no compulsory insurance cover applied to vehicles so used. Given that accidents on private 
land were not covered by compulsory insurance in the RTA88, and therefore outside of the 
MIB Agreements, it was open to the UK to comply with the requirements of arts 3 and 10 
MVID through some body other than the MIB and by some means other than the MIB 
Agreements.
59
 Example (iii) was used to refute an argument presented by the claimant (with 
reference to Riksskatteverket v Gharehveran).
60
 The MIB sought to distinguish 
Riksskatteverket from Francovich and Wagner Miret because, although in Riksskatteverket 
Sweden had not correctly implemented the provisions of Directive 80/987, the relevant 
discretion had been exercised as the state had designated itself as the person liable to meet 
claims guaranteed by the Directive.
61
 The obligation to “take all appropriate measures” in art. 
3 was to provide for a system of insurance, not to compensate the victims of motor accidents. 
This involved discretion as to how such an aim was to be achieved. Driving on private land, 
the MIB continued, was different to driving on a road or other public place (different risks, 
obligations, often different vehicles). Thus, art. 3 provided member states with discretion to 
require third parties (motor insurers) to provide compulsory motor insurance to private land, 
but this had not been implemented. Imposing a liability on the MIB in the current case would 
have been to establish it as a primary compensator rather than art. 10’s intention of the 
national compensatory body possessing a residual function. Further, this residual function 
only became active in the event of a compulsory insurance obligation being present. On this 
last point the MIB attempted to distinguish Farrell v Whitty from the present case. It 
contended that in Farrell, the accident occurred on a road where a contract of insurance was 
required (albeit no insurance policy was held by the driver).
62
 It further used the judgment in 
Csonka that the requirement for the national compensatory body to pay compensation on the 
“breakdown in the system”
63
 of the member state failing to implement the Directive 
necessitated such a breakdown. It did not apply where there was no system at all relating to 




The first argument was countered by Mr Lewis on the basis that according to Irish law (the 
Irish 1961 Act), no insurance was needed in respect of passengers in unseated parts of a 
vehicle. Hence, whilst the MIBI satisfied the claim for compensation from Ms Farrell, to 
require the MIB to do the same in the present case affirmed rather than distinguished the 
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 The second argument was dismissed as being “wholly artificial [and an 
argument] which will not bear scrutiny.”
66
 Such an argument required a very selective use of 
the Csonka ruling
67
 and this was rejected in accordance with the entire jurisprudence on the 
matter of the CJEU. Indeed the gap between,  
 
insurance cover compulsorily required by the domestic legislation and a 
corresponding gap in the protection of the victims of motor accidents… is the very 




The issue of discretion provided to the member states continued in the argument presented by 
Mr Lewis and distinguishing the rulings in Francovich and Wagner Miret with the present 
case. The Directive in Francovich and Wagner Miret referred to the plural “guarantee 
institutions’ and consequently a member state did have discretion as to which fund it was to 
delegate responsibility in respect of parts of the Directive which had not been implemented. 
Article 10 MVID, in contrast, made reference to a “body” in the singular and therefore by 
delegating the obligation to the pre-existing MIB, the UK had fully used its discretion.
69
 This, 
for the purposes of the obligation under EU law, had resulted in the entirety of that art. 10 
requirement being delegated to the MIB. This point was accepted by Flaux LJ at para 65.  
 
Flaux LJ concurred with Soole J that the UK had failed in its obligations under art. 3 of the 
sixth MVID.
70
 He did so by identifying the need for compulsory motor insurance to extend to 
the use of motor vehicle on private land (authors’ emphasis).
71
 This followed from Vnuk and 
Andrade and Nunez Torrerio. Additionally, it failed in its duty under art. 10 of the same 
Directive to assign responsibility for meeting that liability to the national compensation body. 
Flaux LJ further held that art. 3 was unconditional and precise so as to be capable of direct 
effect and that given arts 3 and 10 of the sixth MVID are co-extensive, art. 10 by implication 
also has direct effect. 
 
That the UK has accepted the direct effect of arts 3 and 10 MVID will profoundly affect the 
application of national law. In White v White
72
 the House of Lords held that the MIB 
agreements were not susceptible to a Marleasing
73
-type purposive interpretation of national 
law. This position has been reversed. Coupled with the newly established status of the MIB, 
the application of the articles can be asserted directly against the MIB without the problem 






Soole J addressed three questions in Lewis:  
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(i) Whether any judgment Mr Lewis may obtain against Mr Tindale is a liability which is 
required to be insured against pursuant to Part VI of the 1988 Act;  
(ii) If any judgment Mr Lewis may obtain against Mr Tindale is a liability which is not 
required to be insured against pursuant to Part VI of the 1988 Act, whether the MIB is 
otherwise obliged to satisfy such judgment pursuant to Directive 2009/103/EC; and 
(iii) Whether the provisions of the relevant Directives have direct effect against the MIB.  
 
He answered question one in the negative and questions two and three in the affirmative. 
That decision marked a sea-change in the adherence of the national courts to substantial 
matters of EU jurisprudence. National law has been out of step with regards EU motor 
vehicle insurance law for decades. Sometimes the courts have demonstrated an understanding 
of the disparity and provided an appropriately compliant interpretation of the RTA88 and 
UDA.
75
 At others, and more frequently, they have arrived at conclusions which contradict the 
reasoning of the CJEU and the clarity contained in the MVID on a ‘holistic’ comparison 
between the EU laws and the suite of national legislative and administrative provisions.
76
 
They have continued a denial of fundamental rights to third party victims of accidents 
involving motor vehicles, despite clear instruction as to the deficiencies in national law. 
 
This judgment is significant with regards 1) the broadening of the concept of vehicles; 2) the 
ending of the limited geographic scope of responsibility contained in the RTA88, and 3) the 
position of the MIB as a body which constitutes an emanation of the state. That these issues 
were already clearly identified by the CJEU is regrettable, as is the fact that the new 
clarification of the law will apply only until the UK withdraws from the EU. Given that the 
MIB applied to the Court of Appeal and then direct to the Supreme Court to appeal the 
decision, and that neither the UK nor the MIB have amended the offending elements of the 
legislation or Agreements do not bode well for a continuation of this level of protection. The 
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 s. 6(3) may be some comfort as to the retention of 
existing EU laws pending legislative or judicial changes at a national level, yet the history of 
the UK’s compliance in this area leaves little confidence in a change of governmental 
direction. The rulings are a vindication for the arguments presented, preceding Lewis, which 
have highlighted breaches of EU obligations through the relationship between the MIB and 
the Secretary of State. If the UK does leave the EU as intended on October 31 2019, it is apt 
to mark a happy Halloween for the MIB and the victories gained in Lewis and MIB v Lewis 
are likely to be short-lived.  
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